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COMMENTS 
Effective Representation and Multimemher Districts 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although most state legislative districts are "single-member" 
districts drawn to provide for the election of one representative by 
voters within a defined geographical area,1 many states have estab-
lished "multimember" districts in which voters elect two or more 
legislators from a single constituency.2 In recent years, members of 
various minority interest groups, most typically, residents of urban 
Negro ghettos, have brought actions contending that multimember 
districting deprives them of equal protection of the laws in violation 
of the fourteenth amendment.8 These challenges to multimember-
I. While the majority of state legislative districts in 1955 were of the single-member 
variety, only nine states were apportioned completely into single-member districts, and 
thus 12% of the nation's state senators and 45% of its state representatives were elected 
in multimember districts. Klain, A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a 
Recount and a Reappraisal, 49 AM. POL. Ser. R.Ev. 1105, 1106-11 (1955). These findings 
were substantially confirmed in 1962 by P. DAVID &: R. EISENBERG, STATE LEGISLATIVE 
REDISTRICTING: MAJOR lssUES IN THE WAKE OF JUDICIAL DECISION 20 (1962) [hereinafter 
DAVID&: EISENBERG]. David and Eisenberg found that 3,179 legislators were elected from 
3,179 single-member districts across the nation, while 2,704 state legislators were 
elected from 927 multimember districts. Most of the multimember districts were house 
rather than senate districts. There have been no thorough studies showing the status 
of multimember districts since the major reapportionment cases of the early l960's, 
but there seems to be a general trend away from their use: Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have eliininated multimember districts com-
pletely. See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND 
PoLmcs 504 (1968) [hereinafter DIXON]. 
2. The following states, among others, have some large multimember districts. In 
Arkansas, thirteen legislators are elected from one district, five legislators are elected 
from each of two districts, four legislators are elected from each of three districts, and 
three legislators are elected from each of six districts. Yancey v. Faubus, 251 F. Supp. 
998, 1003-04 (E.D. Ark. 1965). In Georgia, seven legislators are elected from one multi-
member district and three legislators are elected from each of two districts. Dorsey v. 
Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259, 262 (N.D. Ga. 1964). In Texas, fourteen legislators are 
elected from the multimember district of Dallas County, ten legislators are elected 
from Bexar County, and eight legislators are elected from Tarrant County: three 
districts elect two representatives each, two districts elect six representatives each, and 
other districts elect seven, five, four, and three representatives respectively. Kilgarlin 
v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 454-58 (S.D. Tex. 1966). In Mississippi, ten state represen-
tatives and five senators are elected from one district, five representatives are elected 
from each of two other districts, and seven legislators are elected from another district. 
Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492, 495-96 (S.D. Miss. 1967). In Wyoming, ten legis-
lators are elected from one district, and four legislators are elected from each of two 
others. Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450, 452 (D. Wyo. 1965). In Nevada, forty 
assemblymen are elected from sixteen districs and twenty senators from thirteen dis-
tricts. Dungan v. Sawyer, 253 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D. Nev. 1966). For a general discussion 
of the multimember district and its effects, see Silva, Compared Values of the Single-
and Multi-Member Legislative District, 17 WESTERN PoL. Q. 504 (1964); Hamilton, 
Legislative Constituencies: Single-Member Districts, Multi-Member Districts, and 
Floterial Districts, 20 WESTERN PoL. Q. 321 (1967); DIXON, supra note 1, at 504-15. 
3. See, e.g., Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), revd. on other 
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districting schemes have been based on the argument that the concept 
of equal protection incorporates more than the mere notion that state 
legislative districts must be apportioned so that each elected official 
represents a substantially equal number of persons voting;4 plain-
tiffs have claimed that the equal protection clause also guarantees a 
voter's right to "effective representation"-a concept of broader 
scope than mere mathematical equality among districts. 5 It is this 
right to effective representation which is allegedly infringed by the 
multimember districts. 
The minority interest-group members who have challenged the 
validity of multimember districts have argued that since such districts 
have large populations, their groups become submerged in constitu-
encies which are dominated politically by more powerful groups 
than their own, and which groups also espouse interests differing 
significantly from their own. Thus, the minority interest-group 
members have claimed that multimember districts have diluted 
their voting power and have precluded them from electing sub-
stantially the same number of representatives that they would have 
been able to elect had the multimember districts been apportioned 
into single-member districts. The above argument concludes that 
this inability on the part of minority groups to elect a number of 
grounds sub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 
96 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va.), afjd. sub nom. 
Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965); Schaefer v. Thompson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo. 
1965), afjd. sub nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966); Drew v. Scranton, 229 
F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 40 (1964); Rockefeller v. 
Smith, 246 Ark. 794, 440 S.W .2d 580 (1969); Silver v. Brown, 64 Cal. 2d 3, 409 P .2d 
689, 48 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966); Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W .2d 
355 (1966); Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556 (1964); Hainsworth v. Martin, 
386 S.W .2d 202 (Tex.), vacated and remanded, 382 U.S. 109 (1965). 
The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of multimember districting in Fortson 
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), and plain-
tiffs in many of the subsequent challenges to that form of districting have relied on 
the Court's decisions in those two cases even though the plaintiffs in Fortson and Bums 
were not granted relief. 
4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 
U.S. 633 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland 
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 
678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); 
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 
The one man-one vote standard was made applicable to local governmental units in 
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). See also Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 
397 U.S. 50 (1970). 
5. The Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims that " ••• the achieving of fair 
and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative 
apportionment •••• " 377 U.S. at 565-66. 
The Court had earlier held in Wesberry v. Sanders that under art. 1, § 2, of 
the Constitution one man's vote must be as nearly as practicable of the same value 
as another's in a congressional election. Justice Black, in his opinion for the Court, 
stated that the objective of the Constitution is to make "equal representation for equal 
numbers of people the fundamental goal •••• " 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
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representatives substantially proportionate to their numbers amounts 
to a denial of effective representation in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In order to remedy this 
alleged constitutional infirmity, the groups have sought reapportion-
ment of the multimember districts into smaller, more homogeneous 
single-member districts. 
This argument based on the concept of effective representation 
rests primarily upon language contained in the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Fortson v. Dorsey.6 In that case, the Court declined to 
grant relief to residents of a multimember district in Georgia who 
claimed that they had been denied effective representation. How-
ever, the majority opinion indicated in dictum that the effective repre-
sentation issue was not foreclosed from judicial inquiry simply by 
virtue of a district's compliance with the one man-one vote standards 
set forth in the reapportionment cases.7 The Court, in a paragraph 
that seems to invite challenges to multimember schemes, stated: 
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member 
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a 
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the vot-
ing strength of racial or political elements of the voting popula-
tion. When this is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider 
whether the system still passes constitutional muster.8 
In Burns v. Richardson,9 decided one year after Fortson, the Su-
6. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Fortson was the first case before the Supreme Court which 
involved a challenge under the equal protection clause to the validity of a multimember-
districting scheme. Under Georgia's 1962 Senatorial Reapportionment Act, the state was 
divided into state senatorial districts which plaintiffs conceded were substantially equal 
in population. Throughout most of the state, from one to eight counties comprised a 
senatorial district and the voters elected the senator for that district on a district-wide 
basis. However, the seven most populous counties were each divided into anyivhere 
from two to seven districts, and the voters in each of those counties elected at large 
the number of senators equal to the number of districts in the county. The plaintiffs 
in Fortson brought suit seeking a decree that the county-wide voting scheme in each of 
the multidistrict counties violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. A three-judge district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment and held that the use of both single-member and multimember districts resulted 
in an invidious discrimination against the residents of the multidistrict counties. 
Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ga. 1964). In reversing the district court's 
decision the Supreme Court held that a multimember district did not constitute a 
per se violation of the equal protection clause. The Court pointed out: 
Agreeing with appellees' contention that the multi-member constituency feature 
of the Georgia scheme was per se bad, the District Court entered the decree on 
summary judgment. ·we treat the question as presented in that context, and our 
opinion is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all circum-
stances such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
379 U.S. at 439. For an interesting commentary on the apparently inept manner in 
which plaintiffs' counsel handled the appeal before the Supreme Court, see DIXON, 
supra note 1, at 476-78. 
7. 379 U.S. at 439. 
8. 379 U.S. at 439. 
9, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). 
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preme Court reaffirmed its position that, despite compliance with 
the equal-population test of Reynolds v. Sims,10 apportionment 
schemes which minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a racial 
or political element may invidiously discriminate against the mem-
bers of that element in violation of their right to equal protection.11 
The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving an assertion 
of the claim that a multimember district denies the right of effective 
representation since Fortson and Burns. However, there have been 
several subsequent challenges in lower courts to the validity of such 
districts, and these challenges have generally failed because the 
factual evidence did not demonstrate conclusively that the voting 
strength of a legally cognizable racial or political element had been 
minimized or cancelled.12 In Chavis v. Whitcomb,13 however, a three-
10. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
11. Where the requirements of Reynolds v. Sims are met, apportionment schemes 
including multimember districts will constitute an invidious discrimination only if 
it can be shown that "designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency appor-
tionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to 
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the 
voting population." 
384 U.S. at 88. 
12. See K.ilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), revd. on other 
grounds sub nom. K.ilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 
241 (E.D. Va.), afjd. sub nom. Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965); Schaefer v. Thom-
son, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo. 1965), a/fd. sub nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 
269 (1966); and Silver v. Brown, 64 Cal. 2d 3, 409 P.2d 689, 48 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966). 
In two cases relief was granted and the state was forced to subdistrict multimember 
districts. In Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355 (1966), the Iowa 
supreme court voided a mixed system of single- and multimember districts on the 
ground that a resident of a multimember district possesses greater voting power than a 
resident of a single-member district because he is represented by more legislators. The 
court stated: "The Equal Protection Clause is violated if certain constituents are given 
an unequal number of representatives." 258 Iowa at 1155-56, 142 N.W.2d at 375. Al-
though the plaintiff offered proof showing a minimization of interest-group voting 
strength, the court did not consider that element of the case in reaching its decision. 
Thus, the Fortson dictum was not the basis for the court's order that the entire state 
be redistricted into single-member districts. 
In Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965), a legislative plan grouped three 
counties together into a multimember district from which three representatives were 
elected. Another district, which was made up of four counties, had three representatives. 
The court found no geometric, geographic, or equalization basis for the districting 
scheme. 247 F. Supp. at 107-08. It ordered the multimember districts to be subdistricted 
but, as in Kruidenier, did not rely on the Fortson dictum. Rather, the court reasoned 
that, in light of the 
pattern and practice of discrimination in Alabama as a backdrop, the cavalier 
treatment accorded predominantly Negro counties in the House plan takes on added 
meaning. The Court is permitted to find the intent of the Legislature from con• 
sistency of inherent probabilities inferred from the record as a whole. We, therefore, 
hold that the Legislature intentionally aggregated predominantly Negro counties 
with predominantly white counties for the sole purpose of preventing the election 
of Negroes to House membership. 
247 F. Supp. at 109. The court had placed this "intent" within a constitutional frame-
work: 
Any limitation of the persons for whom votes may be cast is logically a restriction 
on the right to vote. Political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution, but 
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judge federal district court14 in Indiana found that the plaintiff had 
presented sufficient factual evidence to sustain his claim, and there-
fore held that the multimember district under attack in that case de-
nied the plaintiff his right to effective representation in violation of 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, by 
bringing the issue of effective representation squarely into the judi-
cial arena, the Chavis court took another step into the "political 
thicket"15 of extending the scope of judicial review over state legis-
lative apportionment schemes. This Comment will analyze the 
soundness of that step. It is first necessary, however, to examine in 
greater detail the facts and holding in Chavis. 
II. THE CHAVIS CASE 
The plaintiffs in Chavis challenged the constitutionality of a 
multimember district consisting of Marion County16 from which 
eight state senators and fifteen state representatives were elected at 
large.17 One of the plaintiffs in Chavis was a Negro resident of 
the abridgement of voting rights on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude is forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has 
long recognized that the Fifteenth and the more inclusive Fourteenth Amendments 
were adopted with the special intent of protecting Negroes and their voting 
rights .••• We conclude that the Constitution itself requires a distinction between 
the familiar political abuse of gerrymandering and gerrymandering for the purpose 
of racial discrimination. 
247 F. Supp. at 105. Thus, Sims also turned on grounds independent of the Fortson 
dictum. 
In a recent Arkansas case, Rockefeller v. Smith, 246 Ark. 794, 440 S.W .2d 580 (1969), 
the plaintiffs alleged representational disparities between single• and multimember 
districts. The plaintiffs offered evidence which showed that identifiable interest groups 
were submerged into a large multimember district which elected thirteen legislators. 
The state supreme court reversed, on jurisdictional grounds, a county court's order 
granting relief. 
l!I. 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind.), redistricting order per curiam, 307 F. Supp. 1362 
(S.D. Ind. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970). The state had appealed the 
court's decision on the merits, and had appealed separately the subsequent redistrict• 
ing order. Probable jurisdiction was noted in both cases on March 16, 1970. 397 U.S. 
979 (1970). However, on March 23, 1970, that order was revoked, the cases were con• 
solidated into one appeal, and probable jurisdiction was noted. 397 U.S. 984 (1970). 
See note Ill infra. 
14. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of the case, see note 17 infra. 
15. This phrase was first used by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 
549, 556 (1946). 
16. Marion County includes the city of Indianapolis and comprises the Twenty-Sixth 
District of the Indiana House and Nineteenth District of the Indiana Senate. 305 F. 
Supp. at 1366. 
17. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), the suit was tried before a three-judge 
court in the Southern District of Indiana, since the complaint prayed that the statute 
establishing the multimember district, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-102, 34-104 (Burns Supp. 
1968), be declared violative of the United States Constitution. The court stated that 
"[t]he complaint seeks declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.5.C. § 2201 and injunctive 
relief would necessarily accompany a judgment adverse to defendants." 305 F. Supp. at 
1!166. The action was originally commenced against the Indiana General Assembly and 
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Marion County. Significantly, he did not claim that there were 
deviations in population among Indiana's legislative districts which 
violated the one man-one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims; nor did 
he claim that the state had engaged in overt racial gerrymandering. 
Rather, the plaintiff relied solely on the claim that the Marion 
County multimember district diluted the voting strength of the 
its individual members; later the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to join Governor 
Edgar D. Whitcomb as a defendant. By further order of May 12, 1969, the district 
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as against the Indiana General As· 
sembly and its individual members. 305 F. Supp. at 1366. 
Although the court ruled that the claim was not properly a class action, it did permit 
plaintiffs to maintain the action individually. See the separate order of June 18, 1969, 
305 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (S.D. Ind. 1969). By an order on the same date, the court granted 
the petition of certain intervening defendants for leave to intervene nunc pro tune 
June 12, 1969, pursuant to FED. R. C1v. P. 24(b)(2). Plaintiffs a_lleged that the state 
statutes which established the Marion County state house and senate district operated 
to violate their rights under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. Jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964). 
When the case finally went to trial, numerous plaintiffs sued in their own behalf and 
in behalf of persons similarly situated. Plaintiff Chavis is an Indiana resident living 
outside the Center Township Ghetto area. He alleged that he had an active interest 
in protecting the voting rights of the inhabitants of the Ghetto area whose interests and 
voting propensities approximated his own. However, the court ruled that he was not 
entitled to relief since he was not a resident or voter in the Center Township Ghetto. 
305 F. Supp. at 1390. 
Plaintiffs Ramsey and Bryant alleged that they were part of a cognizable interest 
group which regularly engaged in bloc voting and which was cancelled out by the 
voting of more powerful interest groups with contrary interests in Marion County. 
Plaintiff Bryant was granted relief, but plaintiff Ramsey was denied relief since he was 
not a resident of the Center Township Ghetto as defined by the court. 305 F. Supp. at 
1390-91. 
Plaintiff Hotz, a white resident of Marion County outside Indianapolis, alleged that 
suburban Republicans were "deprived of a proportionate voice as to who their Re-
publican state legislators shall be, in years of Republican victory in Marion County." 
305 F. Supp at 1367. The court ruled that her complaint was "directed to intraparty 
organization and selection of candidates and does not • • • rise to the degree of a con-
stitutional deprivation of equal protection by reason of the statutes here under attack." 
305 F. Supp. at 1389. 
Plaintiff Rowland claimed that he was frustrated in his efforts to cast his vote 
intelligently by reason of the length of the ballot relating to candidates for the Gen-
eral Assembly in the multimember district. The court denied relief, ruling that the 
factor of lengthy ballots alone was "not sufficient to justify a declaration of the uncon-
stitutionality of multi-member districting." 305 F. Supp. at 1389-90. 
Plaintiff Walker appeared before the court in the dual status of a Negro voter 
residing in Lake County (which includes Gary and Hammond) and of an Indiana voter 
residing outside Marion County. He failed to obtain relief as a Lake County Negro 
since he did not show "that Lake County Negroes are a racial minority group which 
has been deprived of representation so as to distinguish them from other Lake County 
resident voters." 305 F. Supp. at 1390. Walker alleged that since he voted for fewer 
legislators than did Marion County residents, he therefore had fewer legislators to 
represent him in the state legislature. The court refused to grant him relief on this 
allegation and held that "in the absence of stronger evidence of dilution, his remedy 
is limited to the consideration which should be given to the uniform-districting prin-
ciple in any subsequent reapportionment of the Indiana General Assembly." 305 F. 
Supp. at 1390. 
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ghetto residents within that district and thus abridged their right 
of effective representation as enunciated in Fortson.18 
In order to demonstrate a denial of effective representation, the 
plaintiff in Chavis introduced extensive data which demonstrated 
that there existed within Marion County a "Center Township 
Ghetto" area.19 Additional data showed that the residents of that 
area were clearly distinguishable from the residents of the remainder 
of the county in terms of salaries, housing, educational level, welfare 
status, and unemployment rate.20 The plaintiff also established that 
the residents of the Ghetto were predominantly Negroes, and hence 
that they constituted a racially homogeneous group.21 On the basis 
of this social and economic data, the plaintiff alleged, and the court 
found, that because of their distinctive minority characteristics, the 
Negro residents of the Ghetto had interests in areas of substantive 
law-such as housing regulations, welfare programs, garnishment 
statutes, and unemployment compensation-which diverged sharply 
from the interests of nonresidents of the Ghetto.22 Thus, the court 
found that the Negro residents of the Center Township Ghetto were 
an identifiable element of the voting population within the Marion 
County multimember district.23 
18. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra. 
19. After referring to dictionary definitions, pertinent demographic determinants, 
and the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 6 n.l (1968), 
the court adopted the following definition of the word "ghetto" for the Chavis case: 
Ghetto-A primarily residential section of an urban area characterized by a higher 
relative density of population and higher relative proportion of substandard hous-
ing than in the overall metropolitan area which is inhabited predominantly by 
members of a racial, ethnic, or other minority group, most of whom are of lower 
socioeconomic status than the prevailing status in the metropolitan area and whose 
residence in the section is often the result of social, legal, or economic restrictions 
or custom. 
305 F. Supp. at 1373. The Center Township Ghetto consists of certain census tracts of 
land and their subdivsions within the city of Indianapolis in Marion County, 305 F. 
Supp. at 1380-81. As the court stated: "This does not represent the entire ghettoized 
portion of Center Township but only the portion which is predominantly inhabited by 
Negroes and which was alleged in the complaint." 305 F. Supp. at 1380-81. The ap-
proximate 1967 population of Center Township was 132,000 of which approximately 
35,000 were white and 97,000 were nonwhite. Approximately 99.8% of the nonwhite 
population was Negro. 305 F. Supp. at 1380 n.ll. 
20. The court employed exhibits offered by both parties. Selected census tracts which 
were chosen for comparison included one relatively wealthy suburban area, three areas 
which were disputably within the Ghetto area as alleged by the complaint, six tracts 
within the Ghetto areas as referred to in the complaint, and one tract randomly chosen 
to typify a white ghetto portion not mentioned in the complaint. Eight tables were 
used comparing the different tracts with regard to housing, social, economic, and critical 
differentiating characteristics. Critical differentiating characteristics included owner-
occupied dwelling units, deteriorated and dilapidated housing conditions, old-age assis-
tance recipients, high school graduates, juvenile delinquency cases, unemployment rate, 
income, and automobile ownership. 305 F. Supp. at 1372-81. 
21. 305 F. Supp. at 1381. 
22, 305 F. Supp. at 1386. 
23. 305 F. Supp. at 1386. 
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After demonstrating that the Negro Ghetto residents were an 
identifiable element, the plaintiff introduced evidence which demon-
strated that the votes of these residents were minimized by the multi-
member-districting scheme. In past elections, the slate of candidates 
offered by one party generally captured all of the Marion County 
district's legislative seats.24 Since much of Marion County was a 
predominantly white suburban area,25 both major parties generally 
offered candidates who catered to the views of the white majority,26 
and thus, the differing views of the Negro residents of the Center 
Township Ghetto were effectively unrepresented. Proof of inad-
equate Negro representation on party slates was evidenced by the 
fact that, from 1960 to 1966, while the residents of the Ghetto ac-
counted for 17 .81 per cent of the total population of the county, 
only 4.75 per cent of the senators and 5.97 per cent of the representa-
tives resided in the Ghetto.27 Furthermore, by controlling the nomi-
nating machinery, the political parties were able to exert consider-
able influence over the actions of the legislators after they were 
elected28-if a legislator's views consistently diverged from the party 
line, he normally was not nominated for re-election. Because a party's 
slate of candidates could succeed only by seeking to obtain the votes 
of the white majority, the court found that "a legislator elected from 
Marion County is hesitant to express the interests of the residents 
of the Center Township Ghetto unequivocally in the legislative 
chambers, even though he may believe it proper that those interests 
be furthered.''29 Finally, the court determined that the population 
of the Center Township Ghetto "is sufficient in size to elect approx-
imately two members of the House of Representatives and approxi-
mately one senator if these were specific single-member legislative 
districts within Marion County.''30 Viewing all of these factors to-
24. The district court stated that "since 1920 only slightly more than 1% of the 
General Assembly candidates from Marion County have been elected from the political 
party which did not generally prevail." 305 F. Supp. at 1385. For party statistics in this 
regard, specifically dealing with Marion County, see Hamilton, supra note 2, at 324. 
Silva, Relation of Representation and the Party System to the Number of Seats 
Apportioned to a Legislative District, 17 WESTERN PoL. Q. 742, 769 (1964), states that 
"the more members per district, the greater the disproportion between each party's 
share of the statewide vote and its share of seats in the chamber." Many monographic 
studies of state and metropolitan areas have demonstrated the validity of this gen-
eralization. See, e.g., Waltzer, Apportionment and Districting in Ohio: Components of 
Deadlock, and Lamb, Michigan Legislative Apportionment, in THE PoLmcs OF REAP-
PORTIONMENT 173, 267 (M. Jewell ed. 1962); M. COLLINS, M. DAUER, P. DAVID, A. I.ACY, 
&: G. MAUER, EVOLVING ISSUES AND PA'ITERNS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE R.EDISTRIC11NG IN LlRGE 
MEmoPOLITAN AREAS (1966); DIXON, supra note 1, at 506-07. 
25. 305 F. Supp. at 1386. 
26. 305 F. Supp. at 1386. 
27. 305 F. Supp. at 1384. 
28. 305 F. Supp. at 1386. 
29. 305 F. Supp. at 1386. 
30. 305 F. Supp. at 1385. 
August 1970) Comments 1585 
gether, the court concluded that the Marion County multimember 
district minimized the votes of the Negro residents of the Center 
Township Ghetto area. On the basis of its finding that the Negro 
residents of the Center Township Ghetto were an identifiable ele-
ment, and its finding that the multimember-districting scheme mini-
mized the votes of these residents, the court held that the plaintiff 
had been invidiously discriminated against in violation of his right 
to effective representation implicit in the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment.81 
III. THE MULTIMEMBER DISTRICT: A POLITICAL AND 
LEGAL .ANALYSIS 
In order to assess the impact of the Chavis case, it is first neces-
sary to analyze in greater detail the concept of effective representa-
tion that underlies the Fortson-Chavis rationale, and to consider how 
a multimember district may offend that concept. Finally, it must be 
determined whether the right to effective representation warrants 
the constitutional protection that the Chavis case extends to it. 
A. Interest Groups and Effective Representation 
The most significant aspect of the Chavis opinion is its rec-
ognition that ensuring the equal population of legislative dis-
tricts does not necessarily ensure that all the voters in those districts 
are equally represented. Most courts have felt that the demands of 
equal representation are satisfied if state legislative districts are ap-
portioned so that a substantially equal number of voters reside in the 
various districts within the state.32 But voters are not fungible33-
they have diverse interests. Since governmental policy can either 
impede or further those interests, voters with inconsistent interests 
tend to differ over who should determine that policy. If an indi-
vidual's interests substantially conflict with those of a majority of the 
voters in a legislative district, the candidate of his choice will prob-
ably not be elected.34 Thus, as a matter of political reality, the 
31. 305 F. Supp. at 1385-86. 
32. See cases discussed in note 12 supra, as indicative of the courts' unwillingness to 
become involved with the intricate concepts of representation. See also the discussion at 
note 45 infra of the courts' treatment of alleged political gerrymandering. 
33. The distinctive thing about people, in contrast to trees or acres, is that the 
people are not fungible. Failure to perceive this leads to the "identity of interest" 
fallacy which underlies such simple arithmetic measures as the electoral percentage 
••• and which is the central fallacy of a rigid, simplistic "one man-one vote" theory. 
Although legislators are elected "by voters," as Chief Justice Warren said, they are 
ele~ted by voters who have interests which lead them to organize for group political 
acuon. 
DIXON, supra note 1, at 272. 
34. Of course, factors such as the personal attributes of a particular candidate and 
a lack of awareness of the candidates' positions on the part of the electorate will occa-
sionally upset the operation of this model. 
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strength of an individual vote is dependent upon the voting strength 
of the interest group or groups to which that vote is connected. 
Effective representation as a political concept, therefore, should be 
defined in terms of the voting strength of interest groups.ms 
Multimember districting is particularly conducive to the dilution 
35. See, Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitu-
tional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L REv. 209, 218 (1964): 
[I]n apportionment cases the personal civil right of the voter is intertwined with 
large, overriding questions concerning representation-i.e. concerning political 
philosophies and practices of representation in a dynamically democratic public 
order, in which groups are as relevant as individuals. Indeed, groups and parties are 
the building blocks of political power. Because apportionment involves the creation 
and control of political power, the group dynamics of American politics cannot be 
ignored forever in reapportioning legislatures. 
Professor Dixon has continually advanced the theme that fair representation is not 
achieved through mere compliance with one man-one vote standards. The most recent 
statement of this thesis is found in DIXON, supra note 1, at 17: "in reapportionment 
cases more is involved than the self-centered constitutional right of a voter to cast a 
vote which, at least in mathematical, nonfunctional terms, is weighted equally with 
votes of others throughout the districts • • • ." In Professor Dixon's view, this "more" 
constitutes fair representation and is comprised of several components, at least some 
of which "are as amenable to judicial review as the equal protection standard." Id. 
The book in its thorough history of the reapportionment revolution brings the theme 
of effective representation into continual focus. 
The importance of the group in determining the strength of the votes of individuals 
who are members of that group was referred to in the original reapportionment cases by 
both Justices Harlan and Stewart. Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Reynolds 
v. Sims that: 
[It is] obvious, and, in the context of elections, more meaningful to note that people 
are not ciphers and that legislators can represent their electors only by speaking for 
their interests-economic, social, political-many of which do reflect the place 
where electors live. 
377 U.S. at 623-24. Justice Stewart would have applied to reapportionment cases an 
equal protection standard which keyed on whether a certain state reapportionment 
scheme preserved effective majority rule and whether any rational basis was present in 
the classifications of constituencies comprising that scheme. 377 U.S. at 751. In support 
of this standard, Justice Stewart argued: 
Representative government is a process of accommodating group interests 
through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function is to channel the 
numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the people of a State into the making 
of the State's public policy. Appropriate legislative apportionment, therefore, 
should ideally be designed to insure effective representation in the State's legisla-
ture, in cooperation with other organs of political power, of the various groups 
and interests making up the electorate. In practice, of course this idea is approxi-
mated in the particular apportionment system of any state by a realistic accom-
modation of the diverse and often conflicting political forces operating within the 
State. 
377 U.S. at 749. Justice Harlan pointed out the importance of group power in order 
to bolster his argument that the difficult determination of what interests are to be 
represented should be left exclusively with the legislature. Justice Stewart pointed to 
the importance of interest groups since he believed that all questions of apportionment 
could not be solved at the threshold by merely inquiring into whether each district has 
the same number of inhabitants. For an elaboration of the pluralistic nature of 
American politics, see R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145-46 (1956): 
A. DEGRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (1951); and 
Friedmann, The Changing Content of Public Interest: Some Comments on Harold D. 
Lasswell, in NOMOS V: THE PUBLIC !NTEREsr 84 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962). Friedmann 
states that "one of the outstanding • • • problems of contemporary industrialized 
society, and most particularly in the United States, is the position of group interests 
between the state and the individual." Id. See notes 66-71 infra and accompanying text. 
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of interest group voting strength because a greater number of voters 
must be members of an interest group in order for that group to 
control election results in a multimember district than would be 
necessary to gain this control in a single-member district.36 Illustra-
tively, if a single-member district in a state is composed of one 
hundred voters, an interest group consisting of fifty-one members 
will effectively control election results. If the state decides to com-
bine two single-member districts and create a multimember district 
36. See generally note 2 supra. David and Eisenberg disapprove of the 
generalizations in existing publications in regard to what wiII happen under one 
districting plan rather than another, generalizations usually based on what is 
referred to as "common knowledge," are generalizations that do not rest at all on 
any adequately comprehensive view of recent state experience. 
DAVID &: EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 21. See also, Silva, supra note 2, at 508-09. How-
ever, while generalizations are often inaccurate, especially those concerning the cause-
and-effect relationship between a particular districting scheme and its representational 
effectiveness, it is still worthwhile to note the supposed advantages and disadvantages 
of single- and multimember districts. Professor Dixon summarizes nine attributes of 
single-member districts. He attributes five of these attributes-localism, less qualified 
candidates, weak and decentralized parties, emphasis on candidates rather than parties 
and issues, and legislative responsibility to the constituency involving some independence 
from the party-to the small size of the district rather than to the fact that only one 
legislator is elected from a single-member district. Multimember districts, on the other 
hand, are likely to have less localism, more qualified candidates, more emphasis on 
parties rather than individuals, and stronger and more dominant party apparatus. 
As Professor Dixon points out, any defects resulting from the small size of single-
member districts could be disposed of by having smaller legislatures and larger single-
member districts. DIXON, supra note 1, at 504-05. But cf. note 74 infra and accom-
panying text. 
Dixon cites other attributes of the single-member district which relate to its essen-
tial character. First, legislators elected from single-member districts are likely to have 
shorter tenures of office. But see Silva, supra note 2, at 513. Second, he states that single-
member districts are more conducive to gerrymandering than are multimember dis-
tricts. Third, single-member districts lead to the maintenance of a two-party rather 
than a multiparty system. This tendency may relate not only to the single-member 
district, but more fundamentally to the kind of electoral system employed. DIXON, 
supra note 1, at 505. 
While it is the thesis of this Comment that large multimember districts may lead 
to underrepresentation of significant minority interests, it must be emphasized that 
multimember districts are not inherently evil and that many commentators argue that 
they should not be completely discarded. David and Eisenberg suggest that small multi-
member districts are not as likely to involve the problem of minimization as large 
multimember districts, and that small multimember districts may indeed offer certain 
advantages over single-member districts. The case for the single-member district, they 
contend, while apparently ignoring urban ghettos such as the one involved in Chavis, 
is weakest in metropolitan areas where communities of interests are likely to be broad. 
Oppressive gerrymandering is less feasible in small multimember districts and will be 
avoided if the parties are sufficiently competitive so that they can divide the delegation. 
David and Eisenberg thus urge that in a county with a population between one-half and 
one million people, a few small multimember districts would be preferable to many 
single-member districts. DAVID &: EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 22. 
Although they believe that any district whose residents elect four or five members at 
large should normally be divided into small units, David and Eisenberg see no harm in 
continuing the policies of many states in which two- or three-member districts are 
widely used. Id. Obviously, however, the Marion County monolithic district in the 
Chavis case, with its fifteen representatives and eight senators elected at large, is far 
beyond the size limits for multimember districts envisioned by these authors. 
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whose residents elect two representatives, that district would embrace 
approximately two hundred voters. The fifty-one-member interest 
group would thus be reduced to a minority group which would be 
unable to elect any representatives merely on the strength of its fifty-
one votes.87 The plaintiffs in Chavis, for example, proved that 
Marion County legislators consistently resided in suburban, predom-
inantly white, Washington Township in numbers "far dispropor-
tionate to Washington Township's percentage of the population."38 
The Center Township Ghetto had a twenty-two per cent larger pop-
ulation than did Washington Township, but was the residence of only 
approximately one-fourth of the senators and one-third of the repre-
sentatives it would have had if the Ghetto had elected a percentage 
of the county's legislators equal to its percentage of the county's 
population.39 As a result, Ghetto residents who were sufficient in 
number to control at least one-and probably more-single-member 
district were not able to exercise a proportionate degree of control 
in the Marion County multimember district. 
Thus, because interest groups, and not individuals, are the real 
electors of representatives, and because multimember districts may 
dilute interest group voting strength, multimember districts are 
considerably more likely to thwart effective representation than are 
small, more homogeneous single-member districts.40 
37. It is crucial to recognize the tendency for strong political-patty control over 
nomination procedures. A political party will realize that in large districts only one 
patty will prevail at any given election, and thus will select a slate of candidates which 
will appeal to "majority interests." As a result, individuals seeking to represent minority 
groups residing in large multimember districts may not even succeed in placing their 
names on the ballot. 
38. 305 F. Supp. at 1381-85. 
39. 305 F. Supp. at 1384-85. 
40. For a thorough treatment of the concept of effective representation, see Irwin, 
Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 729 (1969), in which the author argnes that the problems of effective representa• 
tion present essentially political questions which are too complex for judicial resolution. 
See also Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan & Ferguson, The Role of the Representative: Some 
Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmond Burke, 53 AM. PoL. Ser. R.Ev. 742, 
742-49 (1959); J. WAHLKE, W. BUCHANAN & L. FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSfEM: EX· 
PLORATIONS IN LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR (1962); Kornberg, Perception and Constituency 
Influence on Legislative Behavior, 19 WEsrERN POL. Q. 285 (1966); Wahlke, Buchanan, 
Eulau & Ferguson, American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure 
Groups, 22 J. PoL. 203 (1960). 
Despite the complexity of the concept of effective representation, voting power plays 
a major role in representative democracy. Therefore, voting strength can serve impor-
tant functions by providing a wedge for opening channels of communication between 
voters and representatives--a function of particular value to often ignored minority 
groups-and by providing a vehicle for interest-group approval or disapproval of legisla-
tive behavior. Conversely, an interest group's lack of voting strength is likely to cmas• 
culatc that group and thus cause elected representatives to become unresponsive to its 
needs. 
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B. The Equal Protection Clause and 
Effective Representation 
1589 
Once it is established that subdistricting of multimember districts 
can achieve more effective representation for a greater number of 
interest groups, it must be determined whether the failure to sub-
district violates the equal protection clause. The court in Chavis did 
not clearly articulate the legal basis for its conclusion that a multi-
member-districting scheme resulting in the minimization of the 
voting strength of an interest group deprives the members of that 
interest group of their right to equal protection. It is clear, however, 
that the court neither invoked traditional equal protection standards, 
nor relied upon the reasoning of the reapportionment cases that 
state representatives must be elected by substantially equal numbers 
of voters.41 
The traditional test for determining whether a state has denied 
an individual equal protection under the law has been whether a 
statutory classification "can be deemed to be founded on some 
rational and otherwise constitutionally permissible state policy."42 
Under this test the complainant asserting a denial of equal protec-
tion has the burden of showing that the applicable statutory classi-
fication has no reasonable basis and is purely arbitrary and capri-
cious.43 In a case like Chavis the state may be able to point to several 
permissible state policies which rationally justify multimember dis-
tricting. For example, multimember districts may facilitate compli-
ance with one man-one vote standards, and may prevent gerry-
41. None of the plaintiffs complained that impermissible population variations 
existed between the Marion County district and other districts in the state. See note 17 
supra. Nonetheless, the district court"s relief included a redistricting of the entire state 
as to both houses of the Geeneral Assembly. See text accompanying notes 104-11 infra. 
42. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 681 (1966) (Justice 
Harlan, dissenting). 
43. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911), contains a 
classic formulation of the requirements of the equal protection clause: 
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from 
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the 
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only 
when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A 
classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely 
because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in 
some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if 
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence 
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One 
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that 
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. 
Clearly, multimember districts may be founded on the basis of some permissible state 
policy. 
See the discussion on the merits and problems of multimember districts at note 36 
supra, and text accompanying note 44 infra. While multimember districts are actually 
being established, the policy reasons for their establishment are surely not irrational-
disputable as they may be among the political scientists. 
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mandering.H However, the reapportionment cases established the 
principle that restrictions on the franchise require close judicial 
scrutiny,45 and more recent cases have extended that principle by 
holding that such restrictions cannot be upheld unless they are neces-
sary to the achievement of a compelling state interest.46 
It is unlikely that multimember districts which minimize the 
voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting population 
could meet the Court's hybrid rationality test.47 The policy argu-
ments which are traditionally set forth to justify such districts are 
presently subject to much dispute48 and seem to be far outweighed by 
the disadvantages inherent in the establishment of multimember 
districts. The principal objection to multimember districts is based 
on their tendency to deprive minority groups of effective representa-
tion. Since the goal of both the one man-one vote rule and the 
Chavis holding is to promote "fair and effective representation,"49 
it would seem to be irrational to justify a denial of effective repre-
sentation to a minority group by a strict adherence to equal-popula-
tion formulas. Moreover, the fact that other states have satisfied the 
one man-one vote standard without resorting to multimember dis-
tricts indicates that such districting is not necessary to the achieve-
ment of the compelling state interest involved-equal-population 
districting. It would appear, therefore, that multimember districts 
which dilute the voting strength of an identifiable element of the 
44. See note 47 infra. 
45. " .•• any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized.'' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). See also 
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
46. In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), the Court held 
that " •.• if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide resi• 
dents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court 
must determined whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest." See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969). 
47. The Supreme Court in Reynolds mentioned the use of multimember districts: 
"One body could be composed of single-member districts while the other could have at 
least some multimember districts.'' 377 U.S. at 577. This statement was made to rebut 
the argument that Reynolds had destroyed the utility of the concept of bicameralism. 
But in Lucas v. Fourty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731 n.21 (1964), the Court, 
in referring to large multimember districts, said "we merely point out that there are 
certain aspects of electing legislators at large from a county as a whole that might well 
make the adoption of such a scheme undesirable to many voters residing in multi-
member counties.'' Two desirable aspects of multimember districts which might be 
considered compelling state interests are the prevention of gerrymandering and the 
facilitation of "home rule" plans or implementation of legislative programs. While 
gerrymandering may be alleviated through large multimember districts, there is no net 
gain if large interest groups are left with no voting strength. And the facilitation of 
legislative programming has small significance if many voters have no voice in estab• 
lishing those programs. 
48. See note 36 supra. 
49. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). See also Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. 
Supp. 1364, 1386 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (responsive and effective representation). 
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voting population cannot be justified within the Court's definition 
of rationality. 
However, while it may be appropriate to define effective repre-
sentation in terms of interest-group political action, the Supreme 
Court has not yet squarely adopted that position. Since its decision 
in Baker v. Carr, rm the Court has condemned progressively smaller 
deviations in population among both state legislative and congres-
sional districts.111 As one commentator has argued, this obsession with 
absolute population equivalency is based upon the fallacious equa-
tion of equal population with equal representation.52 If the Supreme 
Court has, in fact, concluded that equal population is to be equated 
with equal representation, then the plaintiff in Chavis arguably 
failed to state a cause of action, because there were no alleged devia-
50. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
51. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1969), the Court invalidated 
a districting plan which created congressional districts which varied from the ideal 
figure, based on 1960 census figures, by 12,260 (2.84%) below to 13,542 (3.13%) above. 
The Court rejected Missouri's argument that there was a fixed numerical or percentage 
population variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy the 
"as nearly as practicable" standard. The whole thrust of the "as nearly as practicable" 
approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed numerical standards which excuse 
population variances without regard to the circumstances of each particular case. 394 
U.S. at 530. 
In Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969), the Court applied these principles in 
invalidating New York's 1968 congressional districting statute, which treated seven 
sections of the state as homogeneous regions and divided each of these regions into 
districts of virtually identical population. Thirty-one of the forty-one districts were 
constructed in such a manner, while the remaining ten were composed of groupings 
of whole counties. The most populous district had more than 26,000 (6.488%) above 
the mean population while the smallest district had over 27,000 (6.608%) below the 
mean. 394 U.S. at 545. 
Although these cases dealt with congressional districts, there is no reason to believe 
that the same principles are not applicable to state legislative districts, since the Court 
has referred to the two types of districts interchangeably. Dixon, Warren Court Cru-
sade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote", 1969 SUP. Cr. REv. 219, 222. 
52. "The Court fallaciously equated 'equal-population' districting with 'equal 
representation.'" Dixon, supra note 51, at 228. Professor Dixon distinguishes the 
concepts of equal representation and equal population: 
Functionally, however, there is no such thing as "equal representation" in a 
district system of electing legislators. There may be "equal population" districts, 
which is an objectively verifiable concept. But with a district basis there can never 
be "equal representation" because all districting discriminates by discounting 
utterly the votes of the minority voters. This is the well-known, simple plurality 
rule and it operates district by district as a winner-take-all rule. In this precise 
sense all districting is gerrymandering, both in single member districting and in 
multimember districting, although the effect is more dramatic in the latter instance. 
Id. at 227. 
Dixon also argues that equal representation would be possible only under a system 
of proportional representation: 
A goal of "equal representation" can be approximated only through abolishing 
districts and using proportional representation, such as • • • some version of the 
Hare system. Such proportionalization, whereby all the votes cast in the area 
covered by the legislature are pooled and contending groups achieve legislative 
representation closely proportional to their total popular vote, does represent 
voters equally in proportion to their numbers. In short, "equal representation" is 
generically a proportional representation concept. Id. at 228. 
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tions in population among Indiana's legislative districts. But, as the 
plaintiff in Chavis also demonstrated, equal population cannot be 
equated with equal representation, and the Court's language in 
Fortson suggests that the Court may be willing to recognize this 
distinction.1m Furthermore, that language is consistent with the 
Court's decisions striking down population deviations among dis-
tricts. It would seem possible that by using computers and other 
data-gathering aids, state legislative districts could be drawn which 
have absolutely equal populations and which also do not minimize 
the voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting popula-
tion. 54 Hence, multimember districting should not be presumed 
to be necessary to the enforcement of the one man-one vote rule.1515 
In appears, therefore, that multimember districts which dilute 
the voting strength of cognizable interest groups cannot be justified 
under the equal protection clause, within the Supreme Court's ex-
pressed conceptions of equal and effective representation. It must 
be realized, however, that litigation problems in this area could be 
quite complex, since the issues involved are considerably more sub-
tle than merely applying the one man-one vote test. It is, therefore, 
useful to set out the elements of a cause of action alleging infringe-
ment of the right to effective representation through multimember 
districting. 
IV. MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS AND EQUAL PROTECTION: 
THE PRIMA FACIE CAsE 
A Identification of the "Racial or Political Element" 
In order to state a good cause of action in an effective-represen-
tation case, the plaintiff must first show that he is a member of a 
cognizable racial or political interest group.56 
53. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra. 
54. See Dixon, supra note 51, at 251-53. 
55. In a typical reapportionment case, once the plaintiff proves that population 
variations exist among legislative districts, the state bears the burden of showing that 
such discrepancies are necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. See 
note 46 supra. It is clear from the language in Fortson and Reynolds, however, that 
the state does not bear the burden of justifying the existence of a multimember 
district. The state need not assume that burden until the plaintiff has satisfactorily 
demonstrated that his vote has been diluted through the minimization of the voting 
strength of his racial or political interest group. 
The different allocations of the burden of proof in these two types of cases are 
easily reconcilable. In one man-one vote cases, deviation from the arithmetic equality 
among districts amounts to a per se dilution of the right to vote. But according to 
Fortson and Bums, a resident of a multimember district does not make out a prima 
facie case simply by proving the existence of that multimember district; he must also 
prove that his vote has actually been diluted through minimization or cancellation 
of his particular racial or political element's voting strength. 
56. "The first requirement implicit in Fortson v. Dorsey and Burns v. Richardson, 
that of an identifiable racial or political element within the multi-member district, 
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Thus, in Chavis, the plaintiff sought to establish that the Negro 
residents of the Center Township Ghetto constituted an identifiable 
racial element. 57 Based on the evidence presented, the court con-
cluded that the salaries, housing, educational level, welfare statistics, 
and unemployment rate of the residents of certain proximately lo-
cated census tracts in Center Township brought those tracts within 
the scope of the term "ghetto."58 The court determined that because 
of the vast socioeconomic differences between the Center Township 
Ghetto and other parts of Marion County, the needs of the Ghetto 
residents differed substantially from the needs of the residents in 
the more affluent sections, and that the Ghetto residents had in-
terests in areas of substantive law59 which were not shared by their 
suburban counterparts. Thus, the court held the Ghetto residents 
to be a cognizable racial element. 
The court's reasoning in Chavis indicates that in order to con-
stitute an identifiable racial or political element, an interest group 
must be comprised of individuals who share more than an isolated 
set of characteristics. The members of the group must share a com-
mon "life-style," including such factors as geographical proximity, 
relative equality in economic wealth and social status, and religious, 
ethnic, or racial ties.60 Only if a group is sociologically homogeneous 
can a court reasonably conclude that the members of the group 
have sufficiently common interests in pervasive and well-defined 
areas of substantive law-interests that distinguish the group from 
other residents of a multimember district in terms of the group's 
governmental needs. Therefore, a careful factual inquiry is neces-
sary before a court can grant standing to members of any group in 
multimember-district litigation, and no single common character-
istic, such as religious affiliation or veteran status, should be con-
sidered determinative if members of the group have varying interests 
in other areas.61 
is met by the Negro residents of the Center Township Ghetto." Chavis v. Whitcomb, 
305 F. Supp. 1364, 1386 (S.D. Ind. 1969). 
57. The Center Township Ghetto "does not represent the entire ghettoized portion 
of Center Township but only the portion which is predominantly inhabited by Negroes 
and which was alleged in the complaint." 305 F. Supp. at 1380-81. The approximate 
1967 population of this area was 132,000 of which approximately 35,000 were white 
and 97,000 nonwhite. Approximately 99.8% of the nonwhite population was Negro. 
305 F. Supp. at 1380 n.11. 
58. See note 19 supra. 
59. See note 20 supra. 
60. See generally G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DII.E?.™A: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 1962); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE (1964); 
and K. T AEUBER & A. T AEUBER, NEGROES IN CmES: REsmENTIAL SEGREGATION AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1965). 
61. Under some circumstances, race alone may be a sufficiently identifying char-
acteristic. See notes 62-65 infra and accompanying text. 
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Because the interpretation of socioeconomic data usually is an 
intricate process, difficult questions will arise when a court under-
takes to determine whether a particular interest group is sufficiently 
identifiable to be given legal recognition for purposes of establish-
ing a prima fade case in a challenge to the validity of a multimem-
ber district. This determination may be considerably simplified, 
however, when the alleged interest group consists of the inhabitants 
of a Negro urban ghetto. The continuing controversy over school 
integration obviates the need for extensive proof that race is widely 
recognized as an important differentiating characteristic among 
Americans; and the social and economic homogeneity that is found 
among urban Negro ghetto residents is well documented.62 These 
observations suggest that in cases in which Negroes reside in ra-
cially segregated communities, they will presumptively possess sub-
stantially common interests in pervasive areas of substantive law 
which justify considering such communities as identifiable racial 
elements for purposes of granting such Negroes standing in multi-
m~mber-district litigation.63 This is particularly true in Southern 
cities, where multimember districts are prevalent64 and where there 
has been historic hostility to the full extension of voting rights to 
Negroes.65 
The Fortson dictum, however, was not limited to the voting 
problems of racial elements; it also covered political elements.66 
While it is unclear to what extent the courts will be willing to grant 
standing to political elements to challenge multimember-districting 
schemes, the challenging party clearly would bear the burden of 
demonstrating that a particular group of residents has sufficient 
sociological homogeneity to be classified as an identifiable political 
element meriting legal recognition. In order to sustain that burden, 
the challenging party would be required to produce data which 
62. See note 60 supra. 
63. In Chavis, the fact that a particular census tract included Negro inhabitants 
did not ensure that that tract was part of the Center Township Ghetto in light of 
variances between the included ghetto tracts and other relatively middle-class tracts 
inhabited by Negroes. 305 F. Supp. at 1379-80. Nevertheless, in the Southern states the 
overwhelming significance of the racial factor may group together persons of somewhat 
varying economic and social status. The potentially expansive interests of Southern 
Negroes in the civil rights area and the historic treatment of the Negro in the South, 
coupled with the social mores of Negroes vis-a-vis whites generally, may sufficiently 
identify that racial element as a readily cognizable minority interest group. 
64. See note 2 supra. Southern rural areas are typically not racially segregated. 
See, e.g., Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), revd. on other grounds 
sub nom., Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) (Dallas); D~rsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 
259 (N.D. Ga. 1964), revd., 379 U.S. 433 (1965) (Atlanta). 
65. See, e.g., Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 
(M.D. Ala. 1965). 
66. 379 U.S. at 439. 
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demonstrates socioeconomic similarities among a substantial group 
of individuals. Although this normally would be a formidable task 
in a nonracial context, it is conceivable that certain racially heter-
ogeneous suburban, 67 urban, or rural groups could be isolated as 
distinct political elements as well within the meaning of the relevant 
language in Chavis. There are, however, problems with this argu-
ment. Such groups-unlike Negroes living in urban ghettos or rural 
pockets-are likely to be highly variegated in terms of the social 
and economic status of their members.68 As a result, parties who 
allege that they are a part of a cognizable political element will not 
have a distinguishing characteristic as obvious or as significant as 
race, nor an isolated residential setting like a ghetto, from which 
the conclusion of socioeconomic homogeneity may be rather easily 
dravm. In order to prove the existence of an interest group which 
shares a common life-style, these parties will have to point to factors 
such as the relative permanence of the group within the area, the 
income and educational levels of group members, their job status, 
and their religious or ethnic affiliation. In light of the degree of 
social diversity which characterizes most communities, it seems 
doubtful that many groups sufficiently homogeneous to constitute 
nonracial political elements will develop. 69 
67. Suburbs can be defined as "those urbanized, residential communities which are 
outside the corporate limits of a large central city, but which are culturally and econom-
ically dependent upon the central city.'' THE SUBURBAN COMMUNITY xvii (YI. Dobriner 
ed. 1958). In a complex study, 0, WILLIAMS, H. HERMAN, C. LIEBMAN 8: T. DYE, 
SUBURBAN DIFFERENCES .AND METROPOLITAN POLICIES (1965) [hereinafter WILLIAMS) 
examine various suburban areas and conclude "that differentiation and specialization 
in metropolitan areas results not only in interdependence among local units of govern-
ment ••• but also in divergent local interests and policies that perpetuate demands for 
autonomy.'' Id. at 289. Although this study indicates that suburban attitudes often 
favor some form of metropolitan government, nonetheless, it points out the fact that 
suburbs include many elements with varying attitudes toward governmental policy. 
In at least one case plaintiffs have attempted to identify a suburban or rural group 
as a cognizable interest group. See Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 
355 (1966), in which various plaintiffs alleged that they belonged to a "rural minority," 
a suburban "community of interests," and the minority Republican party. The opinion 
of the court does not mention these allegations, and relief was granted on other grounds 
than the Fortson dictum (see note 12 supra). These allegations are discussed in DIXON, 
supra note 1, at 481-83. 
68. See note 35 supra for a discussion of the general notion that legislative districts 
consist of a variety of different interests. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 
1962 SUP. Cr, R.Ev. 252, 273, points out that "even in the cities there are voters who 
approve of legislative frugality, who dislike freeways or who believe that urban re-
development should be left to private initiative.'' For a study of how suburban groups 
may differ among themselves with respect to social and economic class and views on 
policy questions, see WILLIAMS, supra note 67, at 35-37, 211-38. 
69. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases, 1964 SUP, Cr. R.Ev. 1, 38, stated that 
even in the small towns and villages there are voters who approve of public spend-
ing, who like freeways, and who believe that public initiative is essential to 
make our cities habitable. The welcome truth is that the members of no "interest" 
group have identical views about how to promote the group's welfare. 
A determination of the special interests of any of these "political elements" in partic-
ular areas of substantive law does not simplify the test of identifiability. 
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The Fortson dictum's use of the term "political element" raises 
the question whether political parties are sufficiently identifiable so 
that their members may be granted standing to allege a denial of 
effective representation as a result of a multimember-districting 
scheme.70 Surely, the mere use of the term "political element" does 
not compel a per se conclusion that political parties are legally 
cognizable interest groups. Moreover, under the Chavis test, a polit-
ical party would seldom, if ever, qualify as an identifiable political 
element, because members of a political party normally come from 
different backgrounds and represent varying interests; they seldom 
share a common life-style.71 Therefore, while common political af-
filiation may provide one piece of evidence to support a conclusion 
that a group of individuals shares a common life-style, this factor 
alone falls short of establishing identifiability within the meaning 
of the Chavis decision. 
Once an interest group produces sufficient evidence for a court 
to conclude that that group is identifiable, it may also have to prove 
that it is large enough to merit legal recognition. Obviously, a hand-
ful of people living in a district containing thousands of voters 
cannot reasonably assert that they have a right to elect a legislative 
representative. While the issue of the size of the group will nor-
mally turn on the facts of a particular case, it is fair to say that when 
the members of an interest group number more than fifty per cent 
of the average population of single-member districts within the 
70. See generally DIXON, supra note 1, at 485-99. For a discussion of the objectives 
and tactics of political gerrymandering, see A. DEGRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRE-
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 156 (1963). 
While the Supreme Court has treated questions arising from racial gerrymandering 
as justiciable (Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)), several courts have refused 
to entertain challenges involving political gerrymandering. See, e.g., Sincock v. Gately, 
262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1967); Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 245 (D. Kan. 1966); 
Bush v. Martin, 251 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J. 25, 222 
A.2d 101 (1966); Newbald v. Osser, 425 Pa. 478, 230 A.2d 54 (1967). These courts have 
relied on two recent Supreme Court cases: Badgely v. Hare, 385 U.S. 114 (1966), and 
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965). In Badgely, the Court dismissed "for want 
of a substantial federal question" appeals from the Michigan supreme court by 
plaintiffs seeking relief on a gerrymandering claim. In W.MCA v. Lomenzo, the Court 
aflinned in a per curiam opinion a district court's approval (238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965)) of a reapportionment plan whiclI was contested, inter alia, on the basis of 
partisan gerrymandering. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan asserted 
that by affirming the district court decision, the Supreme Court necessarily was affirming 
a holding that partisan gerrymandering is not subject to constitutional attack. 382 
U.S. at 6. For an argument restricting the scope of these decisions, see DIXON, supra 
note I, at 484-90. 
71. See DIXON, supra note I, at 51-53. Another court has stated that 
. • . [T]he Constitution does not prescribe a single approaclI or motivation for 
the drawing of district lines, and hence the Constitution is not offended merely 
because a partisan advantage is in view. Indeed, it would be difficult to separate 
partisan interests from other interests, since partisan interests may well be but 
a summation of such other interests. 
Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J. 25, 32-33, 222 A.2d 101, 105 (1966) (emphasis added). 
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state,72 the multimember scheme could effectively dilute that group's 
voting strength. Of course, a single-member district could also be 
drawn to splinter the interest group; but such action, if done de-
liberately, would amount to a violation of the fifteenth amend-
ment.73 On the other hand, random drawing of single-member 
districts would be unlikely to decimate the voting strength of such 
a group, and the gerrymandering problem would be avoided if the 
legislature made some effort to draw the districts along rational 
interest-group lines. 
Because of the uncertainties involved in attempting to determine 
what size groups should be protected in a given multimember dis-
trict, it is arguable that no strict numerical test can or should be 
developed. Yet some consideration of group size is imperative for 
obvious practical reasons, and would be aided by sociological and 
demographic analysis of the voting power of groups of different 
sizes in single- and multimember districts. One difficulty with a 
numerical test is that a legislature could circumvent any such test 
simply by decreasing the number of districts, thereby simultaneously 
increasing the number of voters in each single-member district. 
Such action would have the dual deleterious effect of diluting the 
voting strength of interest groups within single-member districts74 
and increasing the size required of an interest group before its 
members could be granted standing to challenge the validity of a 
multimember district. These objections to a numerical test, however, 
are not completely convincing. First, it is unlikely that state legis-
lators would vote to decrease the number of districts since in so 
doing they might effectively vote themselves out of a job. In addi-
tion, with an ever-increasing population, there appears to be a need 
for more, not fewer, representatives to meet the increasing work-
load.75 Finally, the fact that a numerical test would frustrate some 
72. If no single-member districts exist within the state, essentially the same result 
could be reached by taking 50% of the total state population and dividing that figure 
by the total number of legislators in the legislative body involved in the suit. 
73. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960). 
74. This raises the issue of whether very large single-member districts which 
prevent substantial interest groups from electing representatives are constitutionally 
infirm. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion to the Court's summary per curiam 
affirmance in WMCA v. Lomenzo, in which he asserted that discriminatory single-
member districting is not subject to fourteenth amendment attack. 382 U.S. at 5-6. 
See also DrxoN, supra note I, at 484-90. Of course, fifteenth amendment challenges on 
the basis of racial discrimination would be justiciable. 
75. See Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 
VA. L. REv. 928, 977 (1968). It is by no means a unanimously held view that more 
legislative representatives are needed. See NATL. MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE 
CoNsrITUTION 44 (6th ed. rev. 1968); Wirt, The Legislature, in NATL, MUNICIPAL 
LEAGUE, SALIENT lssUES OF CoNsrrrUTIONAL REvISION 68, 74 ij. Wheeler ed. 1961). 
Moreover, in a state with a growing population, the size of single-member districts 
will increase merely by stabilizing the size of the legislative house, as is done with the 
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legitimate interests does not necessarily militate against the use of 
such a test. 
It is submitted, therefore, that some form of numerical test should 
be required. If a numerical test were not required, the courts might 
be invaded with a large number of spurious suits. Furthermore, the 
process of redistricting is costly both in terms of time and of money. 
Thus, suits alleging a denial of effective representatives should not 
be readily maintainable unless the voting rights of members of as-
certainable groups are clearly being diluted. While there may be 
some degree of arbitrariness in the use of the single-member district 
as the basis for the test, the size of these districts is determined on a 
rational basis since virtually all states have redistricted in the past 
eight years in order to conform to Supreme Court apportionment 
standards. 
B. Proving Minimization of the Interest Group's 
Voting Strength 
In addition to proving the existence of a legally cognizable in-
terest group, a plaintiff who is challenging the validity of a_multi-
member district must prove the minimization or cancellation of 
the voting strength of that group by the multimember district. The 
court's analysis in Chavis of the plaintiff's allegations of minimiza-
tion of voting strength in that case indicates that the party claiming 
minimization must sustain a heavy factual burden in order to prove 
his case. Plaintiffs in pre-Chavis cases tended either to predict the 
possible effects of the multimember district before any elections 
actually had been conducted, or to analyze superficially the effects 
of a multimember district in past elections without amassing evi-
dence which tangibly demonstrated minimization.76 These pre-
Chavis attempts to invoke. the Fortson dictum were unsuccessful, 
most often because the plaintiffs did not meet the Supreme Court's 
requirement in Burns v. Richardson11 that "the demonstration that 
a particular multimember scheme effects an invidious result must 
appear from evidence in the record."78 
The plaintiff in Chavis, however, did present abundant evidence 
which demonstrated the adverse effects of the multimember scheme 
on the effective representation of Ghetto residents.79 The first cru-
cial fact was the residency pattern of elected legislators within 
Marion County from 1960 to 1969. Although legislators "consis-
United States House of Representatives. Thus, interest groups in states experencing 
population expansion may find it increasingly difficult to prove that they are large 
enough to merit legal recognition. 
76. See cases cited in note 12 supra. 
77. 384 U.S. 73 (1966). 
78. 384 U.S. at 88. 
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tently resided in Washington Township in numbers far dispropor-
tionately [sic] to Washington Township's percentage of the population 
of Marion County,''80 a disproportionately small number of legisla-
tors resided in the Center Township Ghetto.81 The court observed 
that "[t]he Negro Center Township Ghetto population [was] suffi-
cient in size to elect approximately two members of the House of 
Representatives and approximately one senator if these were specific 
single-member legislative districts within Marion County."82 How-
ever, under the multimember system, the Ghetto was able to elect 
only one-fourth of the senators and one-third of the representatives 
to which its proportionate share of the county's population would 
have entitled it to elect under a single-member-districting scheme.83 
In addition, the plaintiff introduced evidence to prove, and the 
court in Chavis found, that because the political parties controlled 
the nominating machinery, legislators elected from Marion County 
were reluctant to express the interests of the Ghetto residents in 
the state legislature.84 The court discussed both past election re-
sults and the post-election behavior of legislators. Hence, it might 
be argued that Chavis stands for the proposition that a court can 
hold that an identifiable racial or political group is denied its legal 
right of effective representation only if, in addition to showing that 
the voting strength of that group is minimized or cancelled by the 
multimember districts, the plaintiffs also prove that the represen-
tatives elected have failed to respond to the group's wishes and 
needs. 
This interpretation of the Chavis opinion, however, is not com-
pelled by the language of the decision, since the complexity of 
the opinion itself illustrates that any inquiry into the question 
whether representatives are "responsive" to the needs of an interest 
group is at best subjective, qualitative, and uncertain.85 Moreover, 
79. The Chavis court took pains to distinguish the facts in that case from those 
presented to the Supreme Court in Fortson: 
We further note that under Burns v. Richardson, at p. 88, invidious discrimina-
tion resulting from a multi-member districting scheme can be more easily shown 
if certain circumstances, which were not present in Fortson v. Dorsey, obtain. 
This case presents each of those circumstances, leading to the legal conclusions 
here stated. 
!105 F. Supp. at 1386. 
80. !105 F. Supp. at 1381. 
81. !105 F. Supp. at 1385. 
82. !105 F. Supp. at 1385. 
8!!. 305 F. Supp. at 1384. See also tables at 1381-85 which demonstrate population 
relationships among various townships and subdivisions of townships in Marion County 
and the number of legislators who resided in those areas in the years 1960-69. 
84. 305 F. Supp. at 1386. 
85. Proof of party control and subsequent legislative behavior may have been used 
by the Chavis court for several reasons. First, the court may have considered these 
factors as unessential but useful pieces of evidence demonstrating that plaintiffs had 
been denied effective representation. Second, the court may have used evidence of 
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the Fortson dictum discussed only the minimization or cancellation 
of the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting 
population,86 and not the relevance of the legislature's responsive-
ness to such elements. Therefore, a group seeking to prove that it 
has been denied effective representation should not be required to 
demonstrate as part of its prima facie case that the representatives 
who are elected from the multimember district are "unresponsive" 
to the group's wishes and needs. 
Of course, the mere fact that an interest group is not able to 
elect exactly a proportionate number of legislators in every election 
does not necessarily support the conclusion that the voting strength 
of that group has been minimized. The enormous number' of vari-
ables associated with the electoral process makes some random de-
viation from absolute proportionality inevitable. Nevertheless, gross 
disproportions existing over long periods of time, such as those 
described in Chavis,81 cannot reasonably be attributed to chance, and 
hence should be viewed as strong evidence that the minority interest 
group involved has been denied effective representation. 
C. The Irrelevance of Intent in Proving Minimization 
of Voting Strength 
Even though a plaintiff may successfully demonstrate the min-
imization or cancellation of the voting strength of a legally cogniza-
ble interest group, the defendant may urge that the plaintiff is not 
entitled to relief until he also proves that the state intended to 
minimize or cancel the group's voting strength through the use of 
a multimember district. The Supreme Court in Fortson left the 
question of the need to prove intent open when it suggested that 
"designedly or othenvise" a multimember-districting scheme might 
operate to cancel out the voting strength of some racial or political 
element.88 In Chavis, the district court summarily rejected the rele-
vance of legislative intent by emphasizing the term "otherwise" in 
the Fortson Court's language.89• Other federal courts, however, have 
suggested that on the basis of Wright v. Rockefeller,00 proof of leg-
party control to illustrate the fact that Ghetto voters could not elect Ghetto residents 
to represent them. Finally, the evidence may have served to rebut the argument that 
legislators elected from multimember districts represent all residents of a district, 
rather than just particular groups. These alternative interpretations suggest that a 
plaintiff's failure to prove party control and legislative unresponsiveness would not, 
and should not, be fatal to the establishment of a prima fade case. 
86. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. See also note 40 supra. 
87. See note 80 supra. 
88. 379 U.S. at 439. 
89. "It is largely beyond concern whether this effect occurs 'designedly or other-
wise.'" 305 F. Supp. at 1370. 
90. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). It should be noted that Wright was decided before the 
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islative intent to minimize interest group voting strength is essential 
to a successful challenge to the validity of a multimember district.91 
In Wright, the plaintiffs attempted to prove that the New York 
legislature, in establishing congressional districts, segregated the 
voters in Manhattan by virtue of race and place of origin.92 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the legislature intentionally fenced Negroes 
and Puerto Ricans out of a predominantly white upper-middle-class 
district and into three other districts, thereby diminishing their 
effectiveness as a minority-group voting bloc since they were unable 
to elect a representative in the all-white district.93 The plaintiffs 
asked the court to infer discriminatory intent on the part of the 
legislature in establishing the four Manhattan congressional districts 
from the fact that three of the districts were drawn to include the 
overwhelming number of Negro and Puerto Rican citizens in 
the county of New York, whereas the fourth district was populated 
by only a minute percentage of Negroes or Puerto Ricans.94 In ad-
Supreme Court laid down the one man-one vote test in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964). 
91. In Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967), plaintiffs attacked the validity of the 
1965 Texas Apportionment Statute, TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 195(a) (1969) on 
several grounds, one of which was that the apportionment of Texas into single-member, 
multimember, and fioterial districts, rather than into single-member districts only, 
constituted arbitrary and capricious gerrymandering. The district court stated that 
"(p]laintiffs contend that •.• [this districting plan] 'constitutes a scheme designed to 
minimize or cancel out the voting strengh of racial and political elements (i.e., the 
Republican Party, liberal Democrats, and the Negro race) within said districts.' They 
[the plaintiffs] claim that the combination plan results in a constitutionally proscribed 
political and racial gerrymandering." 252 F. Supp. at 432. The court considered of 
crucial importance the absence of any evidence of legislative discriminatory intent: 
"No witness testified that racial considerations motivated the Legislature when it 
drew the district lines • • • , and the Court will not infer the existence of such a 
sinister motive in the action of the Legislature without clear proof thereof." 252 F. 
Supp. at 437. 
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion of the Supreme Court's reversal of the 
district court in Kilgarlin on other grounds, stated that he reserved the question of 
effective Negro disenfranchisement through multimember districting until the case 
is once again brought before the district court. 386 U.S. at 126. 
In Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965), the court, in finding intent 
by the Alabama Legislature to gerrymander racially, pointed out: "Strong inferences 
can be drawn from the reapportionment of some of the Senate districts of a legislative 
purpose to prevent the election of Negroes to membership in the State Senate." 247 
F. Supp. at 106. 
92. 376 U.S. at 53. 
93. 211 F. Supp. 460, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
94. The view that racially drawn districts per se would also violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment finds support in the per curiam 
decisions of the Supreme Court following Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954). These cases outlawed racial segregation in public parks, 
beaches, buses, and golf courses without any discussion of harm resulting from 
discrimination in the use of those facilities. 
Opinion of Judge Feinberg, in Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. at 468-69. See also 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), in which the Supreme Court noted that the 
s~da!<l: tradi~o~y aJ?plied in equal prote~on cases, whi<;h prohibits only arbitrary 
or mv1dious discrimmation and grants the legislature the widest discretion in making 
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dition, the plaintiffs introduced evidence showing irregularities in 
the boundary lines themselves.95 
In denying relief to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court accepted 
the conclusion of the divided three-judge district court "that [plain-
tiffs] failed to prove the New York Legislature was either motivated 
by racial considerations or in fact drew the distinctions on racial 
lines."96 
Based on this language in Wright, lower federal courts in cases 
involving challenges to the validity of multimember schemes have 
sometimes included the factor of legislative intent as a required 
element in a cause of action alleging infringement of a minority 
interest group's right to effective representation.97 However, the 
fact that a finding of legislative intent may be required in cases 
alleging actual racial segregation or racially discriminatory district-
ing98 does not necessarily compel the conclusion that such a finding 
is essential to a successful challenge to a multimember-districting 
scheme. While Wright specifically dealt with alleged racial discrim-
ination, such allegations are not essential in a multimember-district-
ing case. 99 As in the reapportionment cases, the crucial consideration 
in multimember-districting cases is whether the districting scheme 
involved has the effect of diluting the votes of one class of individuals 
as compared to the votes of other residents of the state.100 Once a 
plaintiff demonstrates that a legally cognizable interest group, of 
which he is a member, has had its voting strength minimized by 
classifications, is not applicable to racial classifications because the strong policy em-
bodied in the fourteenth amendment of eliminating racial classification renders racial 
discrimination constitutionally suspect. Therefore necessity, and not mere rationality, 
is the controlling test in cases involving racial classifications. 379 U.S. at 196. 
95. 211 F. Supp. at 469-71, 474. 
96. 376 U.S. at 56. The Court agreed with the three-judge district court that plain-
tiffs' evidence allegedly proving a prima fade case of legislative intent to segregate 
inferred an equally or even more persuasive finding to the contrary. Justices Goldberg 
and Douglas dissented. For a thorough analysis of burden of proof problems, see 
Note, Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders: The Desegregation Decisions 
Plus a Problem of Proof, 72 YALE L.J. 1041 (1963). 
97. See cases cited in note 91 supra. 
98. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), plaintiffs alleged that a local 
ordinance altered the shape of the city from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure; 
the effect of the ordinance was to remove from the city limits almost all of the city's 
400 Negro voters. The Court ruled that on the basis of the alleged facts, the ordinance 
constituted discrimination against Negro plaintiffs in violation of the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and of the right to vote as 
guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment-and that, therefore, those facts sufficiently 
stated a cause of action. S64 U.S. at S46. 
99. The plaintiff in Chavis did not allege that the multimember scheme abridged 
his fifteenth amendment right to vote, probably because proof of legislative intent to 
discriminate was not available, and because the boundary lines of the Marion County 
District were not overly irregular as were the lines in Gomillion. See note 98 supra. 
100. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
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the establishment of a multimember district, he has shown that his 
right to vote has been diluted. Since the clear message of Reynolds 
is that vote dilution violates the fourteenth amendment to the same 
extent as invidious discriminations based on race,101 no showing of 
actual legislative intent to abridge the franchise of certain interest 
groups should be required when a showing of vote dilution is made 
by a plaintiff. 
Members of a racial minority group, therefore, should have al-
ternative grounds for contesting the validity of a multimember-
districting scheme: such plaintiffs may challenge a districting scheme 
by showing either that the legislature intended to segregate on the 
basis of race, or that an improper minimization of their interest 
group's voting strength results from a districting scheme, regardless 
of legislative intent.102 The plaintiff in Chavis employed the second 
alternative, and alluded to his race only insofar as it established 
that he belonged to a cognizable racial element.103 His complaint 
did not allege that district boundaries were drawn on the basis of 
race; rather, it alleged that the multimember district resulted in 
an invidious discrimination by diluting his right to vote. The plain-
tiff viewed the factor of legislative intent as irrelevant and therefore 
unnecessary to his complaint. 
V. THE .APPROPRIATE Rfil.IEF 
The district court in Chavis determined that the dilution of the 
voting strength of residents of the Center Township Ghetto would 
continue as long as Marion County remained a large multimember 
district for purposes of electing members to the state Senate and 
House of Representatives.104 The court also noted that "to redis-
101. 377 U.S. at 586. 
102. It may be argued that these alternatives give black or other racial groups a 
heads-we-win-tails-you-lose option-if a racial ghetto is crammed into one large single-
member district, its residents can base their claim on the ground of racial segregation; 
but if the ghetto is split up among several small single-member districts or absorbed 
by a large multimember district, the residents can argue their claim on the ground of 
vote dilution. See text accompanying notes 114-15 infra. 
103. 305 F. Supp. at 1373-81. 
104. 305 F. Supp. at 1399. 
While there are several variations of the multimember district, none of these varia-
tions would necessarily ensure effective representation. For example, as in Fortson, some 
multimember districts have been subdistricted so that legislators reside in the various 
subdistricts, but are elected at large. Some states have "negative residence" provisions 
which require that one or more of the representatives from a multimember, multi-
county district come from the smaller counties. Under rotation provisions, one or two 
seats are rotated in each election so that some of the legislators in a multimember, 
multicounty system will come from smaller counties. While these measures do alle-
viate the Chavis problem somewhat, the at-large voting provisions make it possible for 
a majority of the population of a multimember district to prevent a minority interest 
group from electing any candidates. 
A final variant of multimember districts consists of "place" voting. Under this system, 
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trict Marion County alone, to provide single-member or any other 
type of districts meeting constitutional standards, would leave im-
permissible population variations between the new Marion County 
districts and other districts in the State."105 In addition to those 
variations that would exist between new Marion County districts 
and other districts in the state, the court took judicial notice of 
impermissible population variations which already existed among 
districts in the state other than the Marion County multimember 
district. The court therefore concluded that a redistricting of the 
entire state for both houses of the General Assembly was neces-
sary.106 However, the court initially withheld issuing an injunction 
until the state legislature had time to enact statutes redistricting 
Marion County and the rest of the state pursuant to the court's 
opinion.107 
Although the Governor and state legislature were allowed ap-
proximately two months-until October I, 1969-to redistrict the 
state, the Governor failed to call a special session of the legislature 
for the purpose of accomplishing that redistricting task.108 There-
widely used in the South, all candidates in a multimember district designate the par-
ticular seats for which they are running. A candidate runs only against the others who 
have designated the same seat, and all voters in the district vote for all seats. DIXON, 
supra note 1, at 514-15. This system has the advantage of at least offering the voter 
the opportunity to choose one candidate over another. However, it may be harmful 
to Negro candidates because it spotlights them. Thus, the different variations of the 
multimember monolith do not necessarily lead to the election of representatives who 
are members of identifiable racial or political elements. See DIXON, supra note 1, at 
512-15. 
105. 305 F. Supp. at 1399. 
106. 305 F. Supp. at 1399-400. The court cited Maryland Comm. for Fair Repre-
sentation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 673 (1964): 
[r]egardless of possible concessions made by the parties and the scope of the con-
sideration of the courts below, in reviewing a state legislative apportionment case 
this Court must of necessity consider the challenged scheme as a whole in determin-
ing whether the particular State's apportionment plan, in its entirety, meets fed-
eral constitutional requisites. 
305 F. Supp. at 1391. Observing that the populations of the State of Indiana and of the 
United States are highly mobile, and thus require occasional re-examination, the court 
concluded that voting strength is a question not "easily accommodated by classical con-
cepts of res judicata or of stare decisis." 305 F. Supp. at 1371. In light of changing 
demographic patterns and the more refined one man-one vote standards developed since 
Stout v. Bottorff, 249 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Ind. 1965), the district court felt that redis-
tricting of the entire state was warranted. 
The court warned that it was in no way intimating that Negroes residing in the 
Ghetto were entitled to a certain number of legislators to represent them as a 
minority group: "Legislative districts are to be drawn with an eye that is color blind." 
305 F. Supp. at 1391. But the court also emphasized that sophisticated gerrymandering 
has been soundly condemned. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
107. 305 F. Supp. at 1400. 
108. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 307 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1969). On August 20, 1969, 
Governor Whitcomb moved the court to stay proceedings. This motion, along with 
a similar motion by intervening defendants who were joined by Governor Whitcomb, 
was denied on September 4, 1969. The Governor did not call a special session of the 
Indiana General Assembly for the purpose of redistricting the state as the court ha~ 
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fore, on October 15, 1969, the court invited various parties109 to 
submit proposed redistricting plans to it. As minimal guidelines 
to be followed by the parties in drawing up their proposals, the 
court required that 1960 census data be used,11° that single-member 
districts be preferred to multimember districts, and that county and 
tmvnship boundary lines be followed in drawing proposed districts 
whenever possible. 
After considering the various plans presented to it, the district 
court, on December 15, 1969, accepted the plaintiff's proposal and 
delivered an order redistricting the state into one hundred single-
member house districts and fifty single-member senate districts.111 
The court found that the plaintiff's plan for redistricting Marion 
County protected the minority interest group comprised of the 
residents of the Center Township Ghetto against minimization of 
voting strength, whereas the proposal submitted by the state com-
bined, in several instances, suburban areas with portions of the 
Center Township Ghetto,112 and thus failed to cure the defects in 
the multimember-districting scheme which was held unconstitu-
tional by the court. 
In its redistricting order, the district court did not explain why 
single-member districts were preferable to multimember districts, 
except to observe that a scheme of single-member districts would be 
more likely to assure the Ghetto minority group of some legislators 
than would a scheme of multimember districts. Yet while the court 
condemned racial gerrymandering, it did not consider that its plan 
might tend to "crowd" Ghetto residents into districts, as New York 
instructed him to do. 305 F. Supp. at 1400. Accordingly, the court concluded that it 
would itself redistrict the state pursuant to its earlier opinion of July 28, 1969, which 
appeared at 305 F. Supp. 1364. 307 F. Supp. at 1364. 
109. The plaintiffs in Chavis, the Senate Legislative Apportionment Committee, and 
the House and Senate majority and minority leaders, among others, eventually sub• 
mitted plans to the court. 307 F. Supp. at 1365. 
110. Objections were raised to the court's use of 1960 census figures in drawing 
districts on the grounds that these statistics were so outdated that they could no longer 
be regarded as credible. In response to these objections, the court cited Grills v. 
Branigan, 284 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D. Ind. 1968): "[T]he Census of 1960 must be tolerated 
until the next official census in order to maintain relative political stability." 307 F. 
Supp. at 1365. 
111. 307 F. Supp. at 1367. The state had appealed the district court's decision on 
the merits to the United States Supreme Court. After the district court rendered its 
December 15, 1969, order redistricting the state (307 F. Supp. at 1!!62), the state pre-
sented to Justice Marshall an emergency application for a stay of the district court's 
judgment. Justice Marshall referred the application to the entire Supreme Court which 
granted the stay on February 2, 1970. 396 U.S. 1055 (1970). On February 6, 1970, the 
Court upheld the stay in a 7-1 decision, with Justice Douglas dissenting. 396 U.S. 1064 
(1970). The state's appeal on the merits is still pending before the Court. Appeals 
from the July 28, 1969, opinion (305 F. Supp. at 1364) and the December 15, 1969, 
order (307 F. Supp. at 1363) have been consolidated into No. 1198. !!97 U.S. 984 (1970). 
See note Ill supra for a summary of the consolidation of the various appeals. 
112. !!07 F. Supp. at 1365. 
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was alleged to have done in Wright v. Rockefeller.118 Although the 
court's action in Chavis arguably could be attacked on the ground 
that it amounted to outright racial gerrymandering, in that the new 
districts were drawn specifically with a view to the Ghetto residents' 
race, such a challenge would be difficult to sustain in light of the 
requisite proof of the element of intent in a racial gerrymandering 
case.114 Moreover, the plaintiff surely could not object to the opera-
tion of his own redistricting plan. Even assuming a new party to 
the litigation were granted standing to challenge the court's plan 
and that party cleared the legislative-intent hurdle, it could still be 
asserted that the new plan was the only way in which the compelling 
state interest in equal and effective representation could be imple-
mented.115 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The questions of determining the optimum size of districts and 
the most equitable and practical boundary lines for districts may 
well extend beyond judicial competence and into the sole purview 
of legislative authority. Although it is highly unlikely that any state 
legislature will ever answer those questions perfectly, legislatures 
should not be deterred from attempting to redistrict in a manner 
which promotes more effective representation for as many citizens 
as possible. But when a certain threshold of representational in-
equity is reached and the state legislature does not provide a remedy, 
then the courts must hear legitimate complaints and, in appropriate 
cases, respond to those complaints by granting affirmative relief. 
A Supreme Court affirmation of the district court's ruling in 
Chavis would bring the concept of effective representation directly 
into the mainstream of the reapportionment revolution. The rep-
resentational inequities in the Marion County multimember dis-
trict present a blatant example of the inability of mere population 
equivalency between legislative districts to ensure effective repre-
sentation. While the Supreme Court in Fortson and the district 
court in Chavis did not clearly explain the relationship between 
effective representation of interest groups and the equal protection 
clause, the doctrinal basis for that relationship can be deduced when 
113. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 
114. See notes 88-103 supra and accompanying text. 
115. See notes 52 and 55 supra. The possible problem of crowding an interest group 
into a single-member district-if such a problem exists in the constitutional sense-is 
considerably less harmful than the problem of minimization which may arise in a 
multimember-district situation. Although crowding may reduce the number of repre-
sentatives which a particular interest group can elect by itself and in coalition with 
other groups, minimization through multimember districting often deprives an in-
terest group of any representation at all. Thus, subdistricting, such as that ordered in 
Chavis, can provide a substantial interest group which is submerged in a large multi-
member district with at least some representation. 
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the right to vote is viewed as a "fundamental right" guaranteed by 
the equal protection clause, and the value of the individual vote 
is recognized as dependent on the voting power of the interest 
group to which the voter belongs. 
By establishing strict standards for the identification of a racial 
or political element and for the demonstration of minimization of 
voting strength, courts will be reasonably able to determine whether 
an interest group's vote is being diluted.116 Yet adherence to such 
strict standards will not prevent courts and legislatures who are en-
gaged in redistricting from conforming both to the one man-one 
vote rules and to the more subtle requirements of effective represen-
tation. 
116. Whatever theoretical problems are normally encountered when a court at-
tempts to apply the tests for identifiability of an interest group, these problems may be 
greatly minimized when the plaintiffs in a case are residents of an urban Negro ghetto, 
as in the Chavis case. It can be readily demonstrated that Negro voters in many states 
belong to groups that have interests which set those groups apart as identifiable racial 
elements. When Negroes are submerged in large multimember districts, their voting 
strength may be minimized, and thus they may be denied their right to effective repre-
sentation. 
